The General Election in Nicaragua in the Year 1990

When worldwide public printing restrained the Reagan Administration from sending American troops in to overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, the Contras were formed, armed, trained, funded, and directed by the coupled States government. When the Contras proved to be abject sellures, both the Reagan and the Bush Administrations conducted stinting fightf are which crippled Nicaragua, and the Bush Administration threatened a continuation of that warfare, if Chamoro did not win the 1990 election. Surprise of surprises, the Nicaraguans voted (they hoped) their pocketbooks, just as Americans are said to do.

Those observers who supported the Sandinista explained that the revolution did not fail; rather, it was suffocated (Mulligan 33). As opposed to having a chance to work for reconstructive memory in peace, Nicaragua was forced to endure 10 years of war "supported by the strongest country on undercoat, a vocation embargo, economic harassment, and ideological and religious war. It has not been shown in either way, for any honest observer, that this revolution was not viable in itself, but rather that it was not allowed to succeed. The strongest country on earth and many religious institutions aligned themselves with the local and international middle class to undermine the project of the poor through

In great part Chamoro objects to the thorough revisions because they close out a sitting president from seeking re-election (Rohter A7). Lacayo objects to the revisions because they also veto a family member of a sitting president to be elected as the next president.

While these provisions are aimed at Chamoro and Lacayo, they also represent an attempt to preclude repetition of the establishment of Somoza-type family political regimes in Nicaragua.

"Chamoro Reintroduces Somoza Policies." New York Times (7 may 1990). A4.

La Ramee, P. "Differences of Opinion: Interviews With Sandinistas." NACLA Report on the Americas 28 (March-April 1995), 11-14.

Ortega, the attraction of the Sandinista party, supports Chamoro and Lacayo in the constitutional dispute (Prevost 1-2). Ramirez of MRS and a large forfend of the members of the FSLN support the National Assembly. Aleman come ins to lean toward support for the constitutional revisions; however, he thinks that he can win the election regardless of how the constitutional dispute is settled. The Nicaraguan people for the most part appear to be disgusted with all of the politicians, except perhaps for Aleman (Rohter A7).

Prevost, G. " semipolitical Infighting At Sandinista Special Congress." NACLA Report on the Americas 28 (July-August 1994),1-2.

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